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Abstract
White Collar crime is a dangerous problem that becomes even more dangerous 
when aligned with computer crime. These two types of crime feed on each other 
and present a global challenge to society and the police. The combination of these 
Iwo types of crime can severely undermine the economy especially in developing 
countries. Il is imperative, therefore, that the police be better trained in the 
sciences of forensic accountancy.
This paper presents definitions, classifications and profiles of how white collar 
crime and computer crime can be intertwined, who arc involved, and the loopholes 
that allow financial assets to be moved undetected across the globe. The paper 
examines computer crimes as they practically progress at different stages. This 
examination addresses criminal techniques such as “trojan horses." “viruses." 
“salami," “logical bombs." and explain the risks that face society, in general, and 
public and private institutions, in particular, as a result of these criminal activities.
This paper also addresses the relationships between cyber crime, money 
laundering, and explains the practice of commingling licit and illicit assets. It 
makes a strong case for training the police in forensic accountancy, an emerging 
discipline by which police experts can collect direct evidence as well as 
circumstantial evidence and apply such scientific concepts as “sampling." 
“forecasting." “ratio analysis." and "flow charts."
This paper concludes by proposing an advanced protocol for police training. That 
protocol focuses on three distinct activities: (1) detection, (2) investigation, and 
“prevention.” It also introduces the reader to available facilities and programs 
where the police can be trained to combat economic crimes.
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Introduction
White collar crime has been a dangerous problem which is made more dangerous 
by the technology of computers. While the term only dates to 1939, white collar 
crimes have been practiced for centuries by kings and presidents, popes and 
generals, ministers of the church and ministers of government, as well as 
bureaucrats and corporate managers. They were then, as they are now, crimes of 
the "rich and the powerful.” They are basically motivated by greed and carried out 
by means of deception, fraud, and extortion. In a sense, the concept of white collar 
crime has exposed the dualistic fallacy of the nineteenth century criminal type: (1) 
crime is committed only by the lower socio-economic class, and (2) law-abiding 
citizens are substantially different from those who fit the criminal type (Poveda, 
1994:4). It was left to Sutherland in 1939 to resolve that fallacy by declaring that 
"white collar criminals are the upper world counterparts of professional thieves" 
(Geis et al., 1995:24). White collar crime continues in all nations, costing societies 
enormous losses economically, socially, and spiritually. In the United States, 
society continues to pay dearly for the suffering caused by Vietnam, Watergate, the 
Savings and Loan scandal, and, of course, addiction to drugs and cigarettes.
With the advent of computer technology, white collar crimes became easier, faster, 
neater, and much more difficult to detect. Especially in the banking industry, white 
collar criminals can now strike more aggressively against assets anywhere in the 
world. Through the use of sophisticated data communication systems, it is now 
possible, for example, to move huge accounts from one bank laundering them 
through several banks around the world, and re-deposit them as a legitimate new 
account, all with a few clicks on the computer's keyboard. The fed wire, one of 
three data communication networks connecting bank computers for the transfer of 
funds, is reported to "transmit an amount equivalent to the entire national debt 
every four days" (Parker, in Geis and Stotland, 1980:201). Financial statements 
and confidential information, essential to white collar crime activities, are now 
readily available through service providers such as Internet, Microsoft Network, 
America On-line, Computer Service, and other data bases. Three of these 
companies. Computer Service, Prodigy, and America Online, have already secured 
more than 4 million subscribers, a number greater than the combined circulation of 
USA Today and The Wall Street Journal combined (Swanson, et al., 1996). As a 
result, white collar criminals can now carry out their illicit schemes with 
mathematical precision because of their access to secret accounts, financial assets, 
consumer listings, and corporate statements.
To make matters worse, financial assets, the principle targets of white collar crime 
are no longer contained in bank vaults or in written statements; they are recorded 
in data systems by electronic forms. As a result, it is estimated that through the 
combination of white collar crimes and computer technology, white collar 
criminals defraud the public of billions of dollars every year. On the positive side, 
however, it should be noted that unlike traditional white collar crimes that were 
growing steadily without being statutorily crimi nalized. the spread of computers 
has forced legislators to enact explicit and distinct criminal laws to deter illegal 
use.
In this article, I intend to present an examination of the socio-legal and economic 
views of white collar crimes as well as their characteristics, definitions, 
classifications, and cost to society. This will be followed by a detailed examination 
of computer crimes and money laundering as the principal requisites for white 
collar criminal activities. This article will conclude by recommending several 
policy implications pertaining to the investigation of these crimes and the training 
of investigators.
Sutherland's Theory of White Collar Crime
The term "white-collar crime" was coined by Edwin Sutherland when he addressed 
the American Sociological Association in Philadelphia in 1939. Sutherland 
forcefully brought the concept to the attention of the scholarly community and the 
world in his denunciation of what he called "the evil machinations at the expense 
of the public well-being" (Geis, Meier, and Salinger, 1995:2). Sutherland describes 
the environment of white collar criminality in these terms:
Present day white collar criminals, who are more suave and deceptive 
than the 'robber baroness' are represented by the princes and captains
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of finance and industry, and by a host of lesser followers. Their 
criminality has been demonstrated again and again in the 
investigations of land offices, railways, insurance, munitions, banking, 
public utilities, stock exchanges, the oil industry, real estate, 
reorganization committee, receiverships, bankruptcies, and politics. 
White collar criminality is found in every occupation as can be 
discovered readily in casual conversation with a representative of an 
occupation by asking him, what crooked practices are found in your 
occupation?” (Sutherland, 1940:30).
Sutherland describes white collar criminality in the fields of business by stating:
White collar criminality in business is expressed most frequently in the 
form of misrepresentation in financial statements of corporation, 
manipulation in the stock exchange, commercial bribery, bribery of 
public officials directly or indirectly in order to secure favorable 
contracts and legislation, misrepresentation in advertising and 
salesmanship, embezzlement and misapplication of funds, short 
weights and measures and misrepresentation of commodities, tax 
frauds misapplication of funds in receiverships and bankruptcies. 
These are what Al Capone called the legitimate rackets (Sutherland, 
1940:31).
Sutherland's reference to Al Capone and "the legitimate racket" is especially 
significant for a better understanding of white collar criminality. Al Capone was, 
of course, a notorious gangster in the 1930s who, despite all the violent crimes he 
committed, the FBI was only able to convict him on charges of tax evasion. 
Sutherland's reference to "the legitimate rackets," was, on the other hand, a clear 
reminder of the practice of gangsters and organized crime activities which was so 
skillfully camouflaged as to appear legitimate.
Sutherland's theory of white collar crime focuses, almost exclusively, on the 
violation of "trust, delegated or implied." Delegated trust are obligations assigned 
to a public official or a corporate manager by virtue of his official authority and, as 
such, are within his duty to preserve. Implied trust, on the other hand, constitutes 
obligations that are not explicitly authorized but are assumed by convention to be 
within the official's moral duty. Sutherland further asserts that violations of trust 
invariably fall within two categories: (1) misrepresentation of asset values, which 
in Sutherland's view, amounts to fraud or swindling, and (2) duplicity in the 
manipulation of power (Sutherland, 1945).
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The former category needs no further elaboration, since (provided that all elements 
of the crime are proven) it presents society with a clear case of theft, thus making 
the public official as culpable as any other criminal. The second category is a little 
more tricky, since it assumes the practice of "double crossing." A good example 
would be the case of a corporation manager who, acting upon inside information, 
purchases land which the corporation will need in the future and then later he sells 
it al an exorbitant profit to the corporation. The basic principle in all such cases is 
"duplicity," an immoral behavior which is no less criminal in white collar crime 
than in common fraud crimes. Sutherland explains the concept of duplicity as 
"holding two antagonistic positions"; one is a position of trust that should always 
be upheld, and the other is in violation of trust in order to achieve "personal gain." 
Sutherland further adds that when public officials and corporate managers are 
compelled by law to make a separation of these two positions, "they make a 
nominal separation and continue by subterfuge to maintain both positions" 
(Sutherland, 1945).
Characteristics of White Collar Crimes
While collar crimes are offenses committed by persons of high social prestige in 
their occupations; hence, the label "white collar" as opposed to "blue-collar"-- the 
former characterizes the so-called "boardroom crimes." while the latter, "street 
crimes," and "occupational crimes" (see Albanese, 1995; Geis. Meier, Parker, 
1983; and Saliner, 1995; Simon, 1996; Swanson, et al I996J. These are "exotic 
crimes" the perpetrators in the past used to be called “robber barons." now it seems 
more fitting to be called "criminals in tuxedos."
While collar criminality is not a recent phenomenon. Aristotle, in Politics, was 
perhaps the first writer who called attention to white collar crimes committed by 
road commissioners in Athens, and the first law against white collar crimes is 
believed to be a 1473 English law prohibiting government agents from stealing 
goods or property placed in their care (Green, 1993:95). Given today's complex 
bureaucracies and business conglomerates, white collar crimes may be legitimately 
considered among the most sordid and inexcusable crimes in modem times. Like 
the offense of thievery in the Islamic tradition, white collar crimes "devour one's 
wealth by false or illegal means" (Quran, Chap.2 :188). But unlike thievery White 
collar crimes are not direct attacks by a person on another's property; they brazenly 
and stealthily cause the demise of the entire society by laying its citizens' economic 
welfare prey to indiscriminate embezzlement (Souryal, et al, 1994).
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White collar crime is nevertheless an ill defined category of offenses committed by 
both governments and private corporations. As a general rule, they are crimes 
committed through negligence, deception, or fraud. In the case of government 
agencies, they are crimes committed against their own people or against others. 
Examples include war crimes, political corruption, abuse of power by government 
agencies, official violence, election fraud, or the systematic involvement in 
domestic crimes by government agents. In the case of private corporations, these 
are crimes committed to increase profits illegally. Examples include: the sale of 
unsafe products, contaminated food, unsafe working conditions, deceptive 
advertising, taking advantage of the disadvantaged, and gamering extraordinary 
profits through deception. Needless to say, all such crimes can have a devastating 
effect on the economic order of the world.
Yet, white collar crimes are, by definition, conspiratorial crimes. They involve 
agreements to participate in illegitimate schemes. While a formal agreement is not 
required, most American courts "require an overt act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy as evidence of a willingness to carry out the planned offense" 
(Albanese, 1996:17) Regardless of how such conspiracies are formed, however, the 
corpus detecti of all such conspiracies is basically "collective embezzlement." 
Collective embezzlement has been defined as "the siphoning off of funds or assets 
from an institution by its management" (Calavita and Pontell, 1991:98). As a 
result, the public tends to perceive illicit activities committed by corrupt 
bureaucrats as those that are committed by corrupt corporate managers. Indeed, in 
a 1979 survey, big businesses in the United States tied with Congress as the "least 
trusted" institutions from a list of ten major American institutions (Simon, 1996:8).
White collar crimes are, by definition, complicated offenses, despite the fact they 
are usually committed by a relatively small number of people. They basically 
require a few well connected, criminally-minded, super-managers (casually known 
as big fish) who are located in strategic locations. These individuals constitute the 
"apex" of a network of obscure operatives (casually known as small fish) who 
surreptitiously "rob" the financial resources of the enterprise through manipulative 
means. A typical white collar crime begins with a conspiracy to commit collective 
embezzlement by means of deception, exploitation, or social betrayal. But for the 
conspiracy to succeed, the participating members may have to commit forgery; to 
mislead prosecution; to perjure themselves; and to avoid conviction, they may have 
to obstruct justice by destroying evidence or implicating a wider circle of possibly 
innocent individuals. In this typical scenario, the public agency or the business 
involved would be used as a vehicle for perpetuating crime against itself. As such,
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white collar crime has also been defined "crimes by the corporation against the 
corporation."
Examples of the public perception of white collar crimes committed by 
government institutions include: (1) the belief by about 90 percent of Americans 
that the United States government was Involved in a conspiracy to murder 
President Kennedy in 1963; (2) the belief that the United States government was 
not truthful during the Vietnam war regarding the spraying of more than five 
million acres in South Vietnam with defoliating chemicals; and (3) the belief that 
agents of the bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms in 1993 burned the Waco. 
Texas compound of the Branch Davidian's cult, killing at least 72 members. The 
agents were later accused of altering their written plans for the assault and lying 
about these plans (Simon, 1996:5).
Major Examples of White Collar Crime
Examples of white collar crimes committed by individuals in high government 
positions include: (1) House Speaker Jim Wright resigned in 1989 after being 
accused of 69 ethics charges including the use of hidden campaign contributions 
and falsifying incomes received from the selling of a book he wrote; (2) 
Congressman Dan Rostenkowski was convicted and sentenced to prison in 1996 
for engaging in corrupt activities spanning three decades. Rostenkowski's crimes 
included hiring "ghost employees" who paid him kickbacks, converting to personal 
use large funds intended to pay for official mailings, and using public funds as 
personal gifts for friends and families (The Houston Chronicle. April 10. 1996); 
and (3) Ronald Brown, the former Secretary of Commerce, who until his untimely 
death in 1996, had been under investigation by a special prosecutor for allegations 
of bribery and kickbacks.
Examples of white collar crimes committed by corporate executives include: (1) 
the chief executive officer’s of America's tobacco companies allegedly amassed 
huge profits through exploiting the smoking population of the world (especially the 
young) by manipulating the levels of nicotine in cigarettes. This manipulation has 
reportedly caused the addiction and the further exploitation of millions of smokers 
around the world, particularly in third world countries: (2) over the last 30 years, 
big industrial corporations were charged with "dumping" toxic waste products into 
the air, water, and landfills, dangerously polluting cities and communities and 
causing an estimated 500,000 deaths each year (Simon. 1996:9); and (3) 
corporations have been willfully marketing products known to be dangerous. For 
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example, Ford Motor Company sold Pinto cars knowing of their defective gasoline 
tanks and General Motors substituted Chevrolet engines in thousands of its new 
Oldsmobiles without informing the customers. American corporations have also 
admitted making bribes of some $ 750 million to officials in foreign countries 
without informing their stockholders (Simon, 1996:8).
Public Perceptions of White Collar Crime
Public response to white collar crime has been ambivalent, to say the least. In most 
cultures, it falls short of expressing the moral indignation usually expressed toward 
other serious crimes. To a large degree, the world community continues to dismiss 
white collar crime as the "creation of movies," "figments of the media," or simply 
"deny that it exists" (Bequai,1994). Even when white collar criminality has been 
admitted, the public normally reacts with placid indifference; in a sense, justifying 
the perception that such criminal activities only involve "other people's money" 
(Calavita and Pontell, 1991).
While such perceptions are grossly misleading, there are explanations for these 
apathetic views :(1) white collar crimes are too complicated; they involve many 
high stake players engaging in a multitude of business arrangements and financial 
systems, obviously, in utmost secrecy; (2) white collar crimes invariably involve 
high ranking government and corporate officials who have great influence on how 
the laws are made and administered; (3) most white collar crimes involve the 
embezzlement of assets that are readily available "somewhere," giving the 
impression that such assets are "nobody's money." Consequently, the targets of 
white collar crime are seen as "game" for those who have the smarts, poise, and a 
sense of adventure to grab them; (4) white collar crimes are well-connected to the 
"highly respectable culture" of computer technology. They are perpetrated by 
aggressive whiz kids including computer programmers, operators, hackers, and 
maintenance personnel; (5) from the media standpoint, white collar crime is no 
longer considered "news." Reports concerning public and private corruption are 
too "common;" they no longer interest the citizens, nor do they help sell more 
newspapers; and (6) white collar crimes have now become global crimes, they are 
much too powerful to stop or deter. To do something about them, therefore, would 
require that all nations enter into international agreements to prevent, detect, and 
prosecute such crimes. Reaching such agreements is obviously easier said than 
done, because many countries stand to reap huge profits by providing safe havens 
for such illegal operations.
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To make matters even worse, white collar criminals are not punished as severely as 
blue collar offenders. In the 1930s and 1940s. "although 547 adverse court rulings 
were made against large corporations, no corporate executives were sentenced to 
prison” (Schmalleger: 1995: 675). More recent studies show that "about 40% were 
sentenced to prison versus 549 of non-white crime collar criminals" (Schmalleger: 
1995: 675). Even "when prison sentences are imposed, white-collar offenders were 
sentenced to 29 months on average, versus 50 months for other crimes." 
Schmallegar explains that for unclear reasons, "our system has seen nothing unjust 
in slapping an 18-year-old inner-city kid with a 20 year prison system sentence for 
robbing a bank of a couple of thousand dollars, while putting a white-collar 
criminal away for just two years in a prison camp for stealing $400 million through 
fraud" (Schmalleger: 1995: 676). This lenient attitude confirms, to a large degree, 
the relative immunity white collar criminals enjoy as a result of their class, bias by 
the courts, indifference by society, or a combination of all.
The Cost of White Collar Crime
The economic impact of white collar crime in America has been staggering. 
Experts estimate that the "yearly cost of embezzlement and theft in American 
businesses exceeds by several billions the losses sustained throughout the country 
from traditional crimes of burglary and robbery" (Bequai.1977:5) Bequai reports 
that "dishonesty by corporate executives and employees has increased the retail 
cost of merchandise up to 15 percent, and in the case of one firm, caused 
shareholders to suffer a paper loss of several hundred million dollars within just a 
few days" (Bequai, 199: 5). Clinard and Yeager (1980) also report that "the total 
monetary damage caused by white collar crime is somewhere between $174 billion 
and $231 billion annually while the economic losses resulting from street crimes 
are estimated to be about $10 billion annually." Based on these figures, it can be 
safely stated that white collar crimes have been one of the most financially and 
socially debilitating crimes. They violate the citizens trust in their socioeconomic 
system, in their system of government, in their fellow citizens, as well as force 
society into a gauntlet of economic exploitation. This fact may verify the 
expression, "more money can be stolen at the point of a fountain pen than at the 
point of a gun" (Schmalleger, 1995: 675).
Two famous examples of white collar crimes from the banking industry shed more 
light on the real cost of white collar crime-the Savings and Loan scandal in the 
United States and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in the 
far East. In the former case, it is estimated that $200 billion were needed over the 
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coming decade to bail out the insolvent saving and loan institutions in addition to 
another $ 500 billion by the year 2000, most of which must be paid by the 
American taxpayer (Calavita and Pontell, 1991: 94). In the BCCI case, the bank 
assets were seized by regulators in 69 countries, making it the largest fraud case in 
the history of global banking (Simon, 1996:55). Estimates show that BCCI may 
have defrauded investors of over $5 billion and possibly as much as $15 billion. In 
1991, the Bank was fined $200 million and forbidden from engaging in any US 
banking activities. Bank officials pleaded guilty to laundering $15 million through 
their Miami and Tampa subsidiaries and paid a record $14.6 million fine. One of 
BCCI's officials was the personal banker to General Manual Noriega of Panama, 
who allegedly was a former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency! 
Furthermore, the scandal may have instrumentally affected the political careers of 
Prime Minister John Major of Britain and former CIA Director Robert Gates, both 
of whom allegedly knew of BCCI illegal activities but did little to stop them 
(Simon, 1996:55).
Is White Collar Crime a Victimless Crime?
Uninformed observers have popularized the view that white collar crime is a 
victimless crime. This view is based on the fact that, that unlike street crimes, 
white collar crime is nonviolent and targets no one in particular. Furthermore, it 
seldom causes physical fear, requires home security measures, or prompts anyone 
to carry a firearm. From a rational standpoint, however, the socioeconomic 
damage that these crimes cause is substantial. They are super predatory crimes that 
while not victimizing any particular category of people (i.e., young, old, male, 
female, rich, poor, minority, majority), cannibalize entire populations of 
unsuspecting citizens and consumers.
Several explanations, however, seem to support the perception of white collar 
crime as "victimless crimes": (1) citizens tend to consider government decisions 
exempt from "real" public scrutiny because they are made in the country's national 
interest. This may, indirectly, condone the view that government is free to act 
deceptively because of its obligation to protect its interests from competition or 
unfair trade; (2) citizens seem oblivious to the hidden cost of white collar crime; 
any increases in the cost of living these crimes may cause is intangible and, to a 
large extent, go unnoticed; and (3) most citizens (as well as law enforcement 
officials) are led to believe that given the enormity and complexity of white collar 
crimes, they are impossible to control, anyway.
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Given these perceptions, it is a sad commentary to note that the enforcement 
measures against white collar crimes (especially in the United Slates) have been 
farily lax and, to a great measure, ineffective. The responsibility of enforcing anti 
white collar crime laws in the United Slates is assigned to federal agencies, leaving 
state and local agencies mostly in the dark. Practically, this responsibility is also 
delegated to only four federal agencies: the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms (ATF), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Nevertheless, these 
agencies have been continuously suffering from "inadequate resources." "lack of 
expertise," or "excessive reliance on voluntary compliance" by the businesses they 
are assigned to regulate (Simon, 1996:119). Not surprisingly, law enforcement 
experts estimate that in the United States, there may be "as few as 300 qualified 
police investigators who possess the necessary skills to properly investigate such 
crimes" (Swanson et al., 1996:604).
The While Collar Crime Debate
Criminologists tend to agree that Sutherland's theory was initially presented as an 
attempt to reform the discipline of criminology which has long advocated that 
crime is a mean behavior committed by "low social status" persons. By presenting 
his theory as a new "discovery ," Sutherland warned his colleagues of the failure of 
criminology to consider more realistic views-that crimes can also be committed by 
"respectable" and "high social status" individuals. By issuing this warning, 
Sutherland pointed out both the weaknesses of criminology and redefined its 
subject matter. Sutherland further explained that as long as traditional criminology 
continued to rely almost exclusively on low-class samples, criminological theory 
cannot possibly explain all types of crime (Poveda, 1994:32).
On the other hand, critics of Sutherland's have been numerous, each pointing out 
one or another shortcoming in his arguments His severest critics, however, were 
those with legal training, most notably Paul Tappan and Robert Caldwell, who 
were also trained sociologists. Richard Quinney was perhaps Sutherland's most 
friendly critic. The thrust of their criticisms was the assertion that white collar 
crime is at best a moral theory that falls outside the traditional scope of the 
criminal law (Poveda:l004: 33). Tappan (1947:276) accused Sutherland of: (1) 
acting as "a white collar criminologist" himself (Sutherland), by using confusing 
terms that do not distinguish between criminals and non-criminals; (2) by using 
personal ethics to create a theory of wrongness that constitutes a gross mutilation 
of criminological thought; and (3) by creating categories of crime under which 
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government or corporate officials could be accused of criminal acts when there are 
no criminal laws forbidding such acts, Sutherland's theory must be seen as 
unnecessary and immaterial; and (4) by talking about white collar crime in such a 
way that ignores the fact that government and corporate practices are, as they 
should be, regulated by professional ethics and values is inappropriate.
Caldwell (1958) criticized Sutherland's theory from another perspective. He 
asserted that the concept of white collar crime violates the sanctity of criminal law, 
especially the dictum of "no punishment without crime and no crime without law." 
And since there were no laws forbidding white collar crime activities, such crimes 
could not exist. Caldwell suggested that Sutherland confused immoral and 
unethical practices with criminality, thus infusing undue subjectivity which can be 
detrimental to the integrity of law. As for Sutherland's categorization of white 
collar crime, Caldwell argued that it was unnecessary simply because public and 
business decisions are normally subject to "ordinary, business practices" (Caldwell, 
1958:33).
Richard Quinney sought to rectify what he saw as inadequacies in Sutherlands's 
formulation of white collar crime. He argued that "efforts to distinguish categories 
of white collar crime or to restrict Sutherland’s definition must be taken in order to 
give the concept more social utility" (Quinney, 1964:285). As a solution, he 
suggested expanding the concept of white collar crime to include all such 
violations committed in the course of other occupational activities, even by 
employees who do not fit the definition of "respectable" or "high social status" 
offenders (Poveda. 1994:35). The most salient point in Quinney's argument is that 
the criminalization of any behavior must be based on intrinsic "wrongness," rather 
than on the characteristics of those who commit such a behavior.
Support for Sutherland's theory, however, continues and the term white collar 
crime is now an integral part of the literature of criminological theory (see Geis, 
Meier and Salinger, 1977; Cullun, Maakestad, and Cavender, 1987, Edelhertz and 
Overcast, 1982; Kramer, 1989; Thornberry, 1975; Wolfgang, Figlio, and; Katz, 
1980). Presentations on white collar crime are made regularly at professional 
meetings of criminologists and sociologists, congressional hearings on the subject 
are continually held, and legislative plans to regulate white collar crimes are a high 
priority on the agenda of the US Department of Justice.
Operational Definitions of White Collar Crime
The term white collar crime, we must remember, is not a legal term. Indeed such a 
definition is so ambiguous it is difficult for criminological researchers to determine 
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the real targets of crime investigations (Simon, 1996). Such a definition can 
include just about everything committed by upper class persons that is illegal but 
nonviolent, involving "traditional notions of deceit, deception, concealment, breach 
of trust, subterfuge or illegal circumvention" (Simon: 1996: 34). Sociologists and 
criminologists, have, therefore, recognized a number of operational definitions. 
For the purposes of this article, two such definitions will be presented:
First, white collar crime as: "crimes committed for the purpose of illegitimate 
financial gain by means of deception by persons having occupational status during 
their exercise of government or business endeavors" (Schmalleger: 1995: 674).
Second, white collar crime as: "an illegal act or series of acts committed by 
nonphysical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain assets of money or 
property, or to obtain business or personal advantage." (McGuire and Adelhertz. in 
Geis and Stotland, 1980:199).
Elements of While Collar Crime
While these two definitions indicate slightly different views of what while collar 
crimes entail, they nevertheless underscore the five basic elements of the crime:
(I) an effective intent (mens rea) to commit a wrong act or to achieve an objective 
in violation of a law or a public policy;
(2) a disguised act (actus reus) by which personal or corporate gain is achieved by 
illegitimate means;
(3) reliance on deceptive means which take advantage of the ignorance or 
carelessness of victims;
(4) acting on the basis of authority derived from one's position as a public official 
or a corporate manager, and
(5) a continuing intent to conceal the violation.
Classification of White Collar Crime
It is important that criminologists and law enforcement officials be able to 
distinguish between three rather distinct categories of white collar crime. While 
they may be broad and overlapping, thus lending themselves to various 
interpretations, the impact of white collar crime must be seen the same. The 
following are the categories of white collar crime based on their impact on society:
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(1) White Collar Crime Activities Directed at Physical Harm.
This category is similar to the activities committed by organized criminals, except 
for being perpetrated by "respectable and high status" persons. Physical harm, in 
this category, refers to serious damage to health, damage caused by disease or 
injury, and death. Examples of physical harm (on the domestic scene) include 
attempts by pharmaceutical companies to sell medicine with hazardous side 
effects; by automobile companies to sell cars with potentially dangerous 
components; by tobacco companies to manipulate nicotine levels in cigarettes to 
promote addiction to tobacco, especially among the young. Examples of physical 
harm (on the foreign scene) include the deliberate destruction of civilian targets 
during the Vietnam war the falsifying of reports by field commanders regarding 
the destruction of enemy targets by spraying millions of acres in South Vietnam 
with defoliating chemicals and the execution of more than 40,000 so called enemy 
agents by the Central Intelligence Agency during the Vietnam war (Simon, 
1996:3).
(2) White Collar Crime Activities Directed at Financial Harm.
This category is closely associated with the previous one except from a financial 
standpoint. Examples include the squabble between President Clinton and 
Congress in 1995 and 1996 over the size of the national budget causing the federal 
government to shut down for several days incurring the loss of billions of dollars in 
wasted productivity; fraud by bank directors and overseers as in the case of the 
Savings and Loans in the United States and the BCCI in Singapore; and illegal 
practices by oil companies, utility companies and insurance companies which rob 
the consumers of basic entitlements by arbitrarily raising the cost of their products 
and services.
(3) White Collar Crime Activities Directed at Moral Harm.
This category is probably the most devastating one since wide scale white collar 
crime activities can damage the "moral climate" of society by inspiring distrust, 
cynicism, and alienation. Also, since persons of wealth and power are culturally 
held to higher standards, being implicated in white crime activities creates negative 
role models which can dull the moral fiber of society. Not only do they perpetuate 
a collective sense of frustration and despair, they promote the attitude "if they can 
do it, I can do it too." Tax authorities have validated this attitude when they noticed 
that after exposure of former President Nixon's tax deceits, false reporting of taxes 
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suddenly increased substantially (Geis, Meier, and Salinger, 1995:84). The most 
significant case, perhaps, illustrating damage to the moral fiber of a nation is 
Watergate. The "ghost" of Watergate continues to hold a demoralizing effect on 
the mental and spiritual well-being of America, even a quarter of a century later. 
While the events of Watergate were in themselves unimportant, the chain of 
betrayals including lying, cheating, and stealing associated with (he case 
overwhelmed the American spirit. Polls indicate that as a result of Watergate, 
public confidence in government has been low, and as one poll in particular 
reveals, "68 percent of Americans continue to believe that their government lied to 
them" (Simon. 1996:3).
The Centrality of Social Betrayal in White Collar Crime
The three categories of white collar crime arc, in a holistic sense, related They 
create a sense of "social betrayal" especially since harm in one category would 
cause harm in the other two. In the "minds and hearts" of common citizens, it 
makes little difference whether the harm is physical, financial, or moral, as long as 
it inflicts the sentiment of "social betrayal."
The concept of social betrayal is embedded in the social foundation of the human 
race. It identifies the balance of power and restraint endemic in the social contract 
between the governed and the governors--that government officials cannot lie. 
cheat, or steal. Inherent in this obligation is the expectation that government 
officials execute all laws faithfully, without bias or prejudice, fear or favor, malice 
or ill will, and without causing undue harm to their citizens (Jefferson. The 
Declaration Of Independence, 1776). This perception of social betrayal has always 
been a powerful force behind national revolutions and social upheavals. It has been 
behind the rise of Hitler and the fall of Communism. Both Germany and Russia, 
respectively, were suffering from what were considered acts of social betrayal In 
the case of Germany, it was by the Allies scheming against them after World War 
I, and in the case of Russia, by the Communist dictatorship scheming against their 
own people for over 70 years.
Central as it may be to the conduct of government, the concept of social betrayal 
continues to be a vague and emotional subject that can only be measured by its 
effects on society—social disappointment, anguish, and alienation. These arc 
indicators which change every time society experiences difficult times and can be 
gauged only on a scale of "seriousness ratings." Such ratings can reflect on how 
deeply hurt the collective conscience of society is. Ratings are. of course. 
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influenced by the differences in age, sex, the amount of harm, the characteristics of 
the victim, the offender, and the kind of relationship between them. For example, 
the sentiment of social betrayal can be considerably heightened when innocent 
people die, professional soldiers defect, nuns are murdered, children are molested, 
or elderly people are robbed.
Seriousness ratings concerning the impact of white collar crime in America have 
been accurate in two recent events: (1) the sudden and unexplained rise in gas 
prices by about 27 % during the summertime of 2001 when most Americans travel 
on vacation, and, (2) the continuing denial by tobacco executives of any 
knowledge associating the manipulation of nicotine in cigarettes to smoking 
addiction, especially by the youths. Despite the fact that both cases indicate an 
assumed high level of "social betrayal," the tobacco case indicates a particularly 
sinister level of betrayal because of its injurious impact on the unsuspecting young 
and the irrefutable scientific evidence supporting the accusation.
Computer Crime: The Plague of Modern Technology
The explosive growth of computer crime technology has taken the world by storm. 
As with any other invention, the spellbinding advance of the computer age has 
created a new menace; a vastly expanded potential for computer crime.
Yet, as in the case of white collar crime, the concept of computer crime has not yet 
been well established. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it has been said that in the 
criminal world there are "fraud, theft, larceny, and computer crime," indicating that 
computer crimes are intrinsically different from all other types of crime: (Parker. 
1983: IX). On the other hand, some experts, see no reason to distinguish between 
computer crimes and other crimes, since society and the legal profession do not 
distinguish between crimes related to the use of sewing machines, kitchen 
appliances, or cameras. This perception, however, is rather fuzzy, since the 
prominence of any crime should be measured by its high rate of incidence, the 
amount of damage it can cause, its lack of prevention capability, its criminal 
leverage, and the ratio between the size of reward it can reap and the amount of 
effort it takes to commit (Parker: IX). The issue, therefore should not be whether 
computer crimes are a separate classification, but whether they possess distinct 
characteristics conducive to more harm.
In response to this question, it should be safe to assume that the misuse of a 
computer can cause more damage than an ordinary weapon. While it is true that 
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one can cause mischief with a knife or make obscene calls with a telephone, these 
devices do not have the potential for abuse as does a computer. People do not store 
secret data or valuable assets in a telephone, and the damage one can inflict with a 
knife is usually limited to the perpetrator's strength and reach. Even when damage 
from computers does not materialize, the potential of misuse can be still significant 
(Gemignani, 1988:61). Interestingly, there are those who believe that computers 
have democratized white collar crime by creating opportunities or big time crimes 
that were not available otherwise to the "little criminal" (Business Week. April 20. 
1981).
Definitions
Before defining the term computer crime, an important distinction must be made 
between two popular terms, computer abuse and computer crime. Computer abuse 
refers to any intentional act involving the knowledge of computer technology 
which allows the perpetrator to make some gain and the victim to suffer some loss 
(Swanson, et al. 1996:604). Computer crime, on the other hand, are illegal acts for 
which the knowledge of computer technology is used to commit an offense 
(Swanson, et al. :604). Most experts, however, tend to use the term to mean a 
broad range of activities consisting of volitional, nonviolent acts involving the use 
of a computer.
Having made this important distinction, the term computer crime can be defined as 
"traditional crimes which acquire a new dimension or order of magnitude through 
the aid of a computer or abuses which have come into being because of the use of 
computers" (Gemignani, 1988:56).
General Characteristics of Computer Crime
From a criminological viewpoint, computer crimes cannot fit the conventional 
categorization of criminological theories (i.e., economic need, conflict theory, 
social control, or biological makeup). If they fit, at all, they more appropriately fall 
in the category of opportunity theory. People who commit computer crimes arc 
generally motivated by a different set of assumptions. These arc basically:
(1) a low risk of detection;
(2) the absence of control structures that regulate the activity;
(3) an attitude toward moral norms and laws which do not deter this form of 
activity;
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(4) an adequate distance between the perpetrator and the victim; and
( 5) a sense of anonymity.
These assumptions will be discussed later in greater detail.
Opportunities for computer crimes have been exploding for two significant 
reasons; the rapid expansion in the use of computers and the more "hookups" 
computers now have with communication data bases such as the Social Security 
Administration and the Internal Revenue Service, on the governmental side, and 
major banks, stock exchanges, hospitals, universities, and air lines, on the business 
side.
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, more and more computers are now being 
connected to the information superhighway, "giving users legitimate (as well as 
illegitimate) access to sensitive sources of information” For instance, Molnar 
(1987:714) reports that a few months ago, electronic and print media gave hours of 
time and yards of column inches to some teenagers from Plainfield, New Jersey, 
who purportedly reached Pentagon security and moved a functioning satellite. 
After further investigation, the computer industry trade paper reported that the 
young hackers had simply gained access to the Department of Defense telephone 
numbers, numbers that can be dialed by anyone using a cellular telephone (Molnar 
1987:714). The reporting of such highly technical computer related crimes has 
heightened public awareness of the vulnerabilities of computer systems. This also 
created, at least in part, the need for more regulatory measures to control illicit 
computer schemes now appearing on "commercial bulletin board" services all over 
the world.
The computer industry may also have given rise to new techniques of vandalism 
which can cause serious implications for persons and businesses who depend on 
computers (Gemignani, 1988:64). Notorious among these techniques are:
(1) Trojan Horses: This technique involves breaking into a bank's data system and 
putting out an instruction for all users to change their password. As the users 
comply, the hacker's program records the new passwords allowing the hacker to 
any assets he chooses. When such a technique is discovered or suspected, the 
financial institution must shut down its systems for days in order to find the Trojan 
Horse and change the passwords of the users.
(2) Salami Techniques: This is an automated technique by which computer 
criminals can steal assets from bank accounts. Since all banks routinely round 
down their accounts (to the nearest dollar) to facilitate their accounting procedure, 
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hackers penetrate the computer system instructing the computer to transfer the 
round down amounts to an account they control and can thus withdraw the funds 
they want.
(3) Viruses: A computer virus is a bogus program that is secretly inserted into 
the software program or into the computer's operating system. The impact of these 
programs runs from disturbing messages to interfering with the computer's 
operations causing the destruction of data, electronic confusion, and printing errors 
(Swanson, et al., 1996:606). Swanson quotes the National Computer Security 
Association statement indicating that in 1994, virus infections caused a loss of $2.7 
billion in the United States including the cost of reconstructing files and lost 
productivity (Swanson, et al. 1996:606).
(4) Logic Bombs: These are illegal program instructions that cause serious damage 
to the data center on certain times of day or night. Gemignani (1988) reports a 
story of a Southern California programmer who was charged with two felony 
accounts of "malicious intent to damage a computer system." The charges 
stemmed from a "logic bomb" he allegedly placed in a program he wrote for a 
customer. The bomb placed a "worm" inside the user's operating system which 
counted the number of times the program was run. When a certain number was 
reached, the worm changed the disk's identification code so that the user could no 
longer reach his own data. Another form of computer vandalism is the practice of 
placing a destructive program on publicly accessible electronic bulletin boards. 
These programs are described to the user as performing useful functions, but in 
reality, contain "logic bombs" (Gemignani, 1988:67).
Factors Influencing Vulnerability to Computer Crime
Several factors influence the vulnerability to computer crimes. They arc gleaned 
here from the US Department of Justice International Summaries (Solarz. 1986)
(1) Complexity and the Volume of Data: This factor refers to the complexity and 
concentration of data in massive data systems. For example, according to figures 
supplied by the National Insurance Administration's Automatic Data Processing 
(ADP) in Sweden (a nation of about 8 million people), the national assistance and 
subsidy system, contains data on 1.7 million children receiving child subsidy and 
other payments; 0.2 million persons receiving income subsidies and public 
assistance; 6.6 million registered insured persons; 1.9 million pensioners; 1.3 
million children who are wards of the state; and 6.7 million persons contributing to 
the national pension fund. Other centralized data system clusters in Sweden 
include the centralized banking system (all banks in Sweden share an integrated 
system allowing transactions to be conducted by customers regardless of the bank 
in which they hold accounts), the police system, the motor vehicle administration, 
the tax administration, the post office, and the telephone company. Among all of 
these clusters, the banking system may be the most complex, since transactions 
take place electronically, including deposits, withdrawals, loan payment; currency 
exchange, accounting, and investments.
(2) Anonymity: This is probably one of the strongest elements that characterize 
the environment within which computer crimes are committed. This environment 
provides almost total anonymity anywhere the user is located including at the 
workplace, at home, in a car, on a boat, or in an airplane. Anonymity encourages 
both the motivation to commit crime and reduces the likelihood of being detected. 
Furthermore, anonymity can be ensured even in the presence of large numbers of 
people. In a fully automated environment, anonymity can be almost absolute 
because of the absence of any other parties who have access to the specific 
transaction. Furthermore, in an automated environment, the perpetrators may 
experience a lesser sense of guilt since any tangible evidence to the crime is 
usually lacking. In a manual environment, by contrast, the operatives can easily 
watch the physical exchange of the stolen items.
(3) Distance from the Victim: This factor makes it both physically and 
psychologically easier to commit crime. As opposed to the perpetrators of 
traditional crime who usually have to face their victims, the geographic distance 
between computer crime perpetrators and their victims may be thousands of miles 
away. Indeed the greater the distance, the lesser the feeling of guilt on the part of 
the perpetrator, since he or she may have very little in common with the victim or 
is not even aware of their human endeavors and interests.
(4) Window of Risk Time: This factor greatly reduces the risk of committing a 
computer crime. In carrying out a traditional crime (i.e., robbery, burglary, or 
theft), one can take minutes or hours during which he/she is normally in a 
heightened state of risk. In a computer crime, on the other hand, this window of 
risk is greatly reduced since the transition can be made so quickly by clicking a 
few buttons on a keyboard without ever being noticed.
(5) System Error: This factor is characteristically significant in committing 
computer crime. It is associated with the inherent tendency of computers to make 
innocent errors. It works on the assumption that since innocent errors occur, they 
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can also be used to mask criminal activity. While most computer errors stem from 
power data quality, in automated environments poor data quality is often difficult 
to detect and correct. Nevertheless, computer experts estimate that about 35 % of 
computer failings are due to human error, 20 % to design error, 30 % to poor 
instruction, documentation, training, and workplace environmental factors (Solarz, 
1986:2).
Cyber Crime
Cyber crime is yet another form of computer crime. The term simply represents a 
new growth in the industry of computers. While there is no definition of what 
constitutes a cyber crime, it is generally considered to be "any illegal activity that 
is committed on the Internet or other global service providers by any computer 
user. In the United States, citizens have a love affair with the Internet which they 
compare to the Wild West- a barren landscape devoid of law and order where 
undesirables can roam at will.
While efforts to regulate use of the Internet are seriously afoot, the network has 
been invaded by a rapid increase in cyber violations. Three computer 
developments may have been behind this phenomenon: (1) the spread of low cost 
personal computers; (2) the soaring number of students and other "moonlighters" 
who are "tapping" into data transmission lines; and (3) the large number of 
employees who access computers through the ubiquitous remote terminals.
Yet, despite this loose definition of cyber crime, such activities fall basically 
within three identifiable categories:
(1) Financial Crimes: These involve the illegal use of a computer system or any 
of its peripherals for financial gain or advantage (Bequai, 1996:23). Financial gain 
may be direct, as in the case of stealing assets from a bank, or indirect, as in the 
case of sabotaging a competitor's data system. The technology used in such a 
crime is a medium for the offense. The manner in which it is employed 
distinguishes financial cyber offenses from other traditional crimes (Bequai, 
1996:23).
(2) Traditional Crimes: These involve the use of computer technology in the 
commission of traditional illegal acts. They include old-fashioned crimes such as 
the sale of pornographic materials, conspiring to commit murder, or killing 
someone in a hospital by sabotaging his/her life support system (Bequai, 1996:231.
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(3) Harassment Crimes: These include a broad range of activities involving the 
misuse of computers. While gaining a financial advantage is not one of the 
purposes of such activities, the basic objective is frolicking or harassing victims 
met on the Internet.
Money Laundering: The Illegitimate Child 
of White Collar Crime and Computer Crime
An alarming, though logical, outcome of the unholy alliance between white collar 
crime and computer crime is the illegal industry of money laundering. Given the 
natural tendency of white collar crimes to expand and the serendipity of computer 
technology, white collar criminals had to invent the practice of money laundering 
as a requisite for survival.
The theory of money laundering is deceptively simple. White collar crime yields 
enormous profits in what is known as "dirty money." But, to legitimately profit of 
this money, these enormous amounts of cash must be systematically "cleansed" or 
"sanitized." The term laundering stemmed from the common reference to 
Mafia-ownedl laundromats since laundromats change dirty clothes into clean 
clothes by removing grime and dirt and making laundered clothes look clean 
(Chaikin, 1991:467). By the same token, money laundering is used "to break the 
paper trail, often by using cash or transferring funds overseas to a tax haven 
(Chaikin, 1991:467). Laundering creates obstacles to government investigators, tax 
prosecutors, and private detectives who may be on the tail of white collar 
criminals. As a result, the lure of white collar crimes increases.
The case of Al Capone, mentioned earlier, is a case in point. He reportedly 
amassed a fortune of $20 million in ten years through bootlegging and gambling. 
Yet when Capone was prosecuted in 1931, he was charged only with tax evasion. 
The conviction of Capone was probably the first lesson white collar criminals 
learned: money that is not reported to tax authorities cannot be spent or reinvested 
without great risks of detection and prosecution (Swanson, et al. 1996:526). It 
logically follows, therefore, that white crime collar criminals must utilize money 
laundering if they are to stay "in business."
Because of its position as a super-target in the world, the United States has enacted 
several laws against money laundering. Due to their legal complexity, I will only 
discuss the more recent statutes, including the far reaching Bank Secrecy Act of
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1986. This act requires that all banks operating in the United States and its 
territories file Currency Transaction Reporting (CTR) with the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) regarding any movement of currency (cash or coin) in excess of 
$10,000. Aggregate deposits to an account totaling $10,000 or more are also 
reported. The banks, as a result, are held criminally accountable for the 
implementation of this act.
Another of the most active money laundering statutes is Title 18 of the United 
Slates Code, sections 1956 and 1967. Although section 1957 is potentially a much 
broader section, there have been relatively fewer prosecutions commenced under 
the former. The article, therefore, focuses primarily on section 1956 (Strafer, 
1989). According to this section, it is a federal crime if:
Whoever knowing that the property involved in a financial transition 
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or 
attempts to conducts such a financial transaction which in fact 
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity
To violate this section, a defendant must be shown to have:
(1) "conducted or "attempted" to conduct;
(2) a "financial transaction;
(3) property which represents the "proceeds" of a specified unlawful activity;
(4) "known" that the property constitutes "proceeds" of "some" unlawful activity;
(5) the "intent" to promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful activity 
(Strafer, 1989:162).
Anatomy of Money Laundering
The principal purpose of money laundering is to create a justification for 
possessing or controlling large assets. Without such a justification, a corrupt 
bureaucrat or a corrupt corporate manager must explain to the tax authorities or the 
"anti-corruption board" why he/she is living in an $8 million mansion, owns a $6 
million yacht, or why his/her spouse’s lifestyle is not commensurate with the 
family income. To avoid these incriminating questions, white collar criminals have 
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to launder their illicit profits since unaccountable funds in their possession can 
attract the attention of tax officials.
Specifically, money laundering is the process of "co-mingling" licit and illicit 
moneies so that they cannot be separated, thus "preventing the discovery or the 
introduction of illegal money into the business" (Swanson, et al.: 526). Because 
most checks and credit card receipts are easy to trace, launderers must locate 
financial or business institutions such as banks, lending agencies, restaurants, bars, 
or massage parlors which can take in big amounts of cash. After a given time, 
these institutions would pay back in legitimate checks or other traceable 
instruments. If money cannot be traced, the basic assumption is that "prosecutors 
may be blocked, confiscation of assets may be avoided, and debts may not be 
recovered" (Chaikin, 1991: 58).
Money can be laundered for either legitimate or illegitimate purposes. Legitimate 
purposes include concealing the assets from the public, competitors, social, 
religious, or other institutions. It is not uncommon, for instance, to use laundering 
to conceal the source of funds in a takeover bid, to hide the beneficial ownership of 
shares in a company, or to pay off foreign agents in a legal manner. Illegitimate 
purposes, on the other hand, are utilized precisely to avoid detection by tax 
authorities, prosecutors, and law enforcement agents. While money laundering has 
been generally thought to be only practiced by drug traffickers, it is obviously not 
limited only to them. It is equally common among white collar criminals, 
organized crime criminals, terrorists, and even traditional criminals if the amounts 
of money involved are exceptionally large.
Types of Money Laundering
It is virtually impossible to estimate the amount of money laundered by white 
collar criminals. One credible source, however, is the Financial Action Task, an 
instrument of the US Department of Treasury. Using a combination of methods, 
the task force postulated that in the United States, the amount of laundered money 
reached $300 billion in 1987 (Chaikin:473). A more reliable estimate can also be 
made from the cash that flows through sample banks. In Miami, for instance, that 
cash flow went from $89 million in 1971 to $5.96 billion in 1985 (Maingot, 
1993:177). Current estimates are certainly expected to be much higher.
Money laundering takes place either in domestic or foreign laundries. In one of the 
foreign cases investigated by the London based Commonwealth Commercial
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Crime unit, an offshore bank in the Caribbean was asked to accept a deposit of 
$300 million at a commission for a kickback in the amount of 3 In other words, 
the bank was to be paid $9 million for agreeing to merely deposit and launder the 
money (Chaikin, 1991:473).
Domestic Laundries: by definition, these involve local businesses which can be 
used as a laundromat. Aside from the morality or immorality of their owners or 
managers (therefore their willingness to be involved in money laundering 
schemes), such businesses must be capable of absorbing large volumes of cash. 
Casinos are a perfect choice because they are a cash intensive business that provide 
financial services similar to those supplied by banks. Typically, casino customers 
deposit small denomination bills and are paid out in large $100 bills or in casino 
checks. This provides an ideal cover for money launderers. Another favorable type 
of domestic businesses is that which deals in expenses that do not van with sales 
volume. A good example are movie theaters. Their pay for rent, electricity, and 
wages are almost constant, regardless of whether the theaters arc full (Swanson, et 
al : 1995: 526). Another favorable type of domestic business is that which 
experiences a high rate of spoilage or other loss of goods Groceries and 
restaurants make great examples.
In Swanson et. al., the authors explain:
Money is introduced into the business and recorded in its general 
income accounts as if it had been received from customers 
Fraudulent invoices for produce or other perishable items are issued 
to these businesses by companies acting as suppliers The grocery or 
restaurant issues checks to these "suppliers” or records the 
transaction as a cash payment The undelivered produce or perishable 
items listed as spoiled and discarded are written off the books The 
grocery store or restaurant thus avoids lax liability, and the funds 
paid to "suppliers" seem legal and may be spent or invested with little 
risk of discovery (Swanson: 526)
Foreign Laundries: These are considered easier than domestic laundries since 
they can absorb greater amounts of cash and their return cycle on the "clean 
money" is shorter. Foreign laundries, depending on their location, may also be 
more brazen in their practices for two reasons: (1) they are less likely to be subject 
to stringent laws and, (2) more likely to have greater influence with the political 
leaders who run the country. Logistically, much of the money profited by white 
collar criminals is first deposited through secret numbered bank accounts in 
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smaller countries such as Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Panama, the Bahamas, the 
Netherlands, Antilles, the Grand Cayman Islands, Nauru, Vanutau, and Uruguay. 
The money is then brought back into the United States as a loan from the 
laundering bank or from a dummy corporation set up under the laws of the foreign 
country. Under this arrangement, not only are the illegal funds hidden from the tax 
authorities and law enforcement agencies, but the interest on the supposed loan 
from the foreign bank is deducted as a business expense (Swanson, et al.:528).
Putting it All Together: Policy Implications 
for Detection and Investigation
The role of the police has expanded rapidly in the last 30 years and thereby 
signifies the increasing complexity of modem societies. To cope with societal 
change, the police must change at a faster pace. The direction of change, however, 
is crucial: unlike the yesteryears when effective police forces were characterized 
by physical strength, weaponry, and the use of torture, the crux of police change 
today has been in the area of knowledge and technology. To be truly effective, 
police forces of today must work in a calm and a calculated environment where 
their priorities are rationally and methodically selected in a scientific manner.
Among the growing dangers which face the police forces (i.e., terrorism, gangs, 
narcotics), combating white collar crimes and computer crimes have been high on 
the list of advanced societies. Sadly, however, and despite all of the good 
intentions of most citizens and government leaders, the law enforcement apparatus 
is ill suited for this new criminal. Bequqi (1977: 14) argues that the police “ lack 
the training and the will, and find themselves engaged in bickering among 
themselves, thus serving the interest of the white collar criminal."
There are several reasons why fighting white collar crime and computer crime is so 
difficult to undertake:
First, low reporting rate. Government agencies as well as financial institutions, 
consulting firms, and corporations are not too interested in reporting fraud and 
embezzlement for fear of adverse publicity. Governments, by definition, avoid the 
appearance of corruption for fear of losing public support since corrupt 
governments are considered primary subjects to revolutions. By the same token, 
financial institutions do not want their customers and potential depositors to think 
they are "untrustworthy" or that they are unable to handle their investments. 
Ironically, in their attempt not to attract attention to their own economic 
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corruption, many governments are reluctant to pass laws criminalizing white collar 
crimes.
Second, complexity of investigation and detection. Unlike street crimes where 
evidence may be in plain view, white collar crimes arc highly technological and 
are committed by "smart criminals," most of whom are better educated than the 
police. Furthermore, these crimes are, by necessity, "secretive crimes" which are 
committed in well guarded offices and homes. Linked by telecommunications and 
working at inconspicuous terminals, white collar criminals arc removed from the 
controls of the workplace. Consequently, eye witnesses are usually lacking, paper 
trails are at a minimum, and the chances of catching the perpetrators in the act is 
almost impossible.
Third, the high potential for police investigations to be stymied. White collar 
criminals (especially those connected with trafficking drugs) are either influential 
people themselves, or are well connected to influential political leaders. As a 
result, law enforcement agencies, especially in non-democratic societies, can he 
faced with a severe dilemma to "turn their faces" the other away or stand the risk of 
losing their jobs. Moreover, it is not unusual that white collar crime activities are 
themselves committed by "higher ups" within the police ranks or by administrators 
who are entrusted to oversee police operations.
Fourth, the difficulty of finding evidence. In white collar investigations the 
police are faced by the difficulty of recognizing key evidence of illegitimate 
activities. This is basically due to the weak training of police Undoubtedly, judges, 
prosecutors, and law enforcement officials who are unfamiliar (or unwilling to be 
familiar) with the serious effects of white collar crime and computer crime will be 
unable to recognize the interdependent nature of evidence that must be collected in 
white collar crime investigations.
The following policy implications will be presented in two categories: those 
related to the investigation process, and those related to the training of 
investigators. The former will address the environment of the investigation 
process-- its coordination and effectiveness; the latter to the investigative skills that 
are necessary to combat white collar crimes.
Specific Implications for Effective Investigation
There are four policy implications in this category. These arc:
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1- The role of the media. Public awareness should be heightened concerning the 
culpability of white collar criminals and the enormity of damage such crimes can 
cause society. Society must first be convinced that white collar crimes are "real 
crimes," if enforcement measures have any chance to succeed. The mass media is 
obviously the premier tool that can serve this purpose. It should be effectively 
utilized to educate the public through exposing the hidden aspects of the problem. 
Furthermore, political parties and governmental agencies should be involved in the 
formulation of stem laws criminalizing such crimes. In addition, sociologists, 
criminologists, and economists should focus on the problem and debate it in their 
professional meetings, and law enforcement agencies should be reeducated as to 
the seriousness of these crimes.
2- Computer experts should be hired. It is easier (and less costly) to train a 
computer expert in the arts of investigation than to train a police officer in 
computer sciences. Experienced computer investigators are so necessary to the 
successful investigation of these crimes because they know what to search for, they 
understand the formidable capacities of advanced computers, and they possess the 
expertise of not attempting moves that can erase data, short-circuit wiring 
connections, or destroy hidden evidence.
3- The number of expert investigators should be adequate.. Such expert 
investigators should be organized in groups best trained to meet the needs for 
intelligence gathering, the interception of communication, the review of financial 
statements, the collection of latent evidence, and the counseling of prosecutors in 
the process of building their cases.
4-Investigators Should be trained in Forensic Accountancy. The training of 
investigators should be both an ongoing endeavor and of the highest quality. In the 
United States, this is accomplished through specialized governmental training 
centers such as the FBI and Secret Service training facilities; The Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center, in Glenco, Georgia; and The Law Enforcement 
Electronic Technology Assistance Program created as a model by Florida's 8th 
judicial circuit.
5- Cooperation with international agencies should be maximized. In this global 
world, white collar and computer crimes cannot be effectively defeated without a 
global strategy of cooperation. White collar crimes and, particularly, money 
laundering activities must be treated as global problems that require the highest 
degree of collaboration between all countries. It is self-evident that if some 
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countries cooperated while others did not, the end result would be the displacement 
of criminal activities from one country to another. The United Nations, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European 
Community, and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) 
have all been instrumental in coordination and facilitating efforts to fight white 
collar crimes and money laundering activities. The situation today dictates that 
unless all nations cooperate in good faith, they will sooner or latter suffer serious 
damages.
The Imperative of Forensic Accountancy
The term forensic accountancy is a new term in the arsenal of contemporary police 
training. The term evolved as a natural requisite for combating computer crime and 
in particular, money laundering. The term presupposes that as criminal 
investigators can recognize crime scenes in a traditional sense, they should also be 
able to recognize crime scenes in cyber crimes. Furthermore, as criminal 
investigators can determine criminal evidence and circumstantial evidence in 
traditional crimes, they should be equally able to determine the same in cyber 
crime investigations. Hence, there is the need for police to learn and skillfully 
practice forensic accountancy.
The fundamentals of forensic accountancy include the use of new methods to 
investigate cyber crime and money laundering. These methods include sampling, 
ratio analysis, and flow charts, to discover laundering operations as well as to 
prosecute the individuals involved in them (Swanson, et al. 2000: 447) l or 
instance, by using sampling, the police forensic accountant can randomly 
determine the number of customers of an establishment used for money laundering 
as well as a conservative estimate of the amount of money spent by each customer. 
By the same method, the police forensic accountant can also project how much 
money is actually received by a suspected enterprise in the ordinary course of 
operation. If the projected income is materially smaller than that reported to taxing 
authorities, it is a good indication that the business is being used for money 
laundering.
Another fundamental concept in forensic accountancy is the use of ratio analyses. 
Such ratios have been used for many years by accountants, investors, and lending 
institutions. (Swanson, et al. 2000: 447). According to Swanson, Chamelin and 
Territo, there are four significant types of rations that can be used by police 
forensic accountants: (I) liquidity ratios that can indicate the abilty of the 
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enterprise to satisfy its immediate financial obligations; (2) operation ratios that 
can indicate the efficiency of the business; (3) profitability ratios that can indicate 
the effective use of assets and the return of the owner’s investment in the business; 
and (4) leverage ratios that can indicate the extent to which the enterprise is 
financed by debt. Another important concept used by forensic accountants to 
discover money laundering involves researching the corporate and ownership 
structures of both the suspected business and all the companies with which it deals.
It should be emphasized, however, that the most significant talent in forensic 
accountancy by police is capitalizing on their ability to combine common 
investigative techniques with advanced accountancy techniques, without 
sacrificing one or the other. Hence, the need for mature and well-experienced 
detectives who are also interested in accountancy and are comfortable working 
with numbers, ratios, and statistical analyses. Such talented individuals should be 
taught both academically and on the job. University degrees should be offered in 
forensic accountancy and “computerology.” Furthermore, such experts should be 
exclusively certified as investigation experts in the field of white collar crime.
Institutions for Advanced Training
Toward fluency in forensic accountancy, it may be appropriate to familiarize the 
reader with one of the most advanced training facilities for forensic accountancy in 
the United States where police officers can be trained in combating white collar 
crime, computer crime, and money laundering.
The Financial Fraud’s Institute (FFI) in Glenco, Georgia is an agency of the United 
States government and is operated by the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center (FLETC). The Institute has the responsibility for designing, developing, 
coordinating, and administering programs devoted to the prevention, detection, 
investigation, and prosecution of complex financial and computer-related frauds. 
While FFI offers exclusive training to federal, state, and local law enforcement 
communities, foreign police personnel can also be trained by bilateral agreement.
The FFI provides investigators with specialty skills and techniques to develop solid 
prosecutable cases in a wide range of crimes. Included are white collar crimes, 
illegal tax shelters, complex financial transactions, illegal activities in support of 
terrorism and criminal conspiracies, and money laundering activities including 
drug smuggling organizations and other illegal enterprises. The Institute also 
equips investigators with accounting skills applicable to the successful detection 
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and prosecution of insurance frauds, electronic funds transfer fraud, and employee 
embezzlement.
One of the most important programs offered by FFI is the Advanced Financial 
Fraud Training Program (AFFTP). The program focuses on the critical elements 
and techniques necessary for the successful investigation and prosecution of 
complex white collar and financial investigations. Courses include: Contract 
Fraud; Electronic Sources of Information; Computer Related Investigations; 
Indicators of Financial Fraud; Financial Institutions; Right to Financial Privacy; 
Money Laundering; Asset Forfeiture; International Investigations and INTERPOL. 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines; Civil Litigation; and Conflict of Interest.
Another program offered by FFI is the Basic Seized Computer and Evidence 
Recovery (BSCER). This program focuses on how computer data is created, 
modified, and manipulated. Courses include: Named Files; Fragmented Erased 
Files; Unfragmented Erased Files; Location data in Unlocated Space; Hidden Files 
and Subdirectories using Camouflage Methods; Locating Unreadable Data. 
Locating Data Unknowingly Written; and Disguised Data.
Another program offered by FFI is the Domestic Money Laundering training 
Program (DMLTP). The subject matter of this program focuses on forensic 
accountancy money and the techniques used to identify, investigate, and prosecute 
these violations. Courses include: Financial Accounting, Domestic/lntemational 
Banking. Money Laundering Statutes; Bank Secrecy Act Title 31; Asset 
Forfeitures, Record Analysis. Expert Witnesses; Financial Crimes Enforcement, 
and Money Laundering Methods and Techniques.
A parallel program to DMLTP is the International Banking And Money 
Laundering Training Program (IBMLTP). This course addresses trends and current 
developments concerning international banking and money laundering. Courses 
include: International Banking Framework, Money Laundering Statues; Finance 
Tracing Money Through Financial Networks; Tax Havens; Bank Secrecy Act; and 
of course, INTERPOL.
Conclusions
This article addresses the alarming problem of white collar crime especially when 
it is associated with computer crime. The product of this alliance is a super crime 
of mammoth dimensions, the surface of which we have just begun to explore. 
Given the sophisticated technology known as the "information super-highway." the 
world may be witnessing a leviathan criminal phenomenon, never before 
encountered. If taken to its extreme, white collar criminals in one country could 
technically invade another country—unless extreme safeguards are in place at all 
times—by siphoning off its public and private assets anywhere these assets are in 
the world, causing the country's assured demise.
While white collar crime has been traditionally ascribed to "respectable and high 
status" persons operating in strategic positions, with the advent of computer 
technology, the crime now attracts anyone who has the technical knowledge to 
"hack" and the criminal will to engage in big-time criminal activity. What further 
complicates the problem is the apparent public apathy toward these crimes, causing 
unjustified leniency in the criminal laws of most advanced countries and the near 
absence of any laws in most others. Furthermore, with the unprecedented growth in 
computer technology, white collar crimes have been transformed into global 
crimes. This requires that all countries "unite" to effectively deter and prevent such 
crimes, otherwise the social and economic landscape of the world will be 
disfigured, especially in the poor countries which would be least likely prepared to 
protect the small assets they may have.
The war against white collar crimes, however, is far from being lost. Political 
leaders, legislators, judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement agencies can turn the 
tide and win the war if their efforts were synchronized in the right direction. 
Toward that synchrony, society should be made fully aware of the staggering price 
it is paying, effective laws should be enacted criminalizing all aspects of white 
collar criminal activities, and penalties should be made as severe as the amount of 
damage these activities cause. Law enforcement agencies around the world should 
be reeducated concerning the legal and social implication of these crimes and be 
totally re-trained in the methods of detection, investigation, and prosecution.
In reference to computer crime, we should acknowledge the golden rule that states 
that "every technology can be beat by a better technology." Accordingly, the 
scientific and technological communities should be mobilized to design new 
technologies capable of protecting society's economic and financial interests. 
Public and private institutions should exercise more vigilance in the way their 
communication and data centers are protected. But, above all, institutions should 
hold their officials, at all levels, accountable by requiring higher ethical standards 
of performance. After all, it is an almost indisputable fact that white collar crimes, 
by any name, are essentially greed crimes.
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